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President Trump first proposed a “‘total and complete shutdown’ of 
the entry of Muslims to the United States” in 2015.1  Three years earlier, 
in 2012, a bakery in Colorado refused to bake a cake for a same-sex 
couple.2  Both of these events spurred controversial Supreme Court cases 
and, although at first glance the two seem entirely different, both cases 
involved claims that the government discriminated on the basis of 
religion.3  Despite being decided by the same Court in the same term, the 
two cases had different outcomes. One decided in favor of the government, 
and the other decided against the government.4 
Both cases also involve statements by governmental officials as 
evidence of animus towards religion.5  In Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. 
Colorado Civil Rights Commission, these statements were used by the 
Court to find animus, but in Trump v. Hawaii, the Court refused to 
consider the statements made by President Trump and other government 
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 1. Jenna Johnson, Trump Calls for ‘Total and Complete Shutdown of Muslims Entering the 
United States,’ WASH. POST (Dec. 7, 2015, 7:12 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-
politics/wp/2015/12/07/donald-trump-calls-for-total-and-complete-shutdown-of-muslims-entering-th 
e-united-states/?utm_term=.07e4a0f4057d [https://perma.cc/GAD2-NP77]; see also Presidential 
Candidate Donald Trump Rally in Mount Pleasant, South Carolina (CSPAN television broadcast Dec. 
7, 2015), https://www.c-span.org/video/?401762-1/presidential-candidate-donald-trump-rally-mount-
pleasant-south-carolina/ [https://perma.cc/9MQ7-VU5W] [hereinafter Presidential Candidate] 
(statement at 00:30:36 minute marker). 
 2. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1720 (2018) 
 3. Id. at 1723–24; Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2417 (2018); Josh Blackman, The Travel 
Bans, 2018 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 29, 56 (2018) (discussing Justice Sotomayor’s view that both Trump 
and Masterpiece ask the same fundamental question of “whether a government actor exhibited 
tolerance and neutrality in reaching a decision.”). 
 4. Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1732; Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2423. 
 5. Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1729; Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2417. 
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officials.6  This Note examines Trump v. Hawaii’s analysis of the 
Establishment Clause claim at issue, and the disconnect between the two 
cases and the possible explanations for it.  This Note argues that the case 
should have been analyzed under the Free Exercise Clause, as was the case 
in Masterpiece.  Further, this Note argues that under both traditional 
Establishment and Free Exercise Clause analysis, the Trump Proclamation 
likely would not have been upheld. 
This Note also argues that by implementing the strange analysis in 
Trump, the Court left an unnecessary loophole in First Amendment 
protections in the area of immigration and national security, a loophole it 
should not be afraid to close.  Trump is an Establishment Clause case 
brought by United States citizens in the United States and should not be 
analyzed under some unique weak standard that allows the President to do 
whatever he wants.  The unusual treatment of this case makes it unclear 
how much scrutiny the Court will apply to Establishment Clause cases 
involving immigration.  Future cases relating to executive orders on 
immigration should instead invoke some form of heightened scrutiny.  In 
cases such as these, the President’s words matter.  The President is the sole 
voice of the United States to the world, and just as the rest of the world 
and the citizens of the United States use these words to understand the 
motivation for the President’s actions, so should the Court. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The First Amendment guarantees that “Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof.”7  Two lines of jurisprudence are especially important for the 
purpose of this Note: cases relating to the establishment of religion, and 
cases relating to the free exercise of religion.8  Each of these lines of cases 
have their own analytical framework.9  Section II.A of the Note discusses 
Establishment Clause claims, the Trump Proclamation, and the case 
arising out of it.  It lays out the history of the Ban from its first version to 
 
 6. Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1731; see Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2435 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 7. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 8. Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint on Governmental Power, 
84 IOWA L. REV. 1, 97–98 (1998) (“As a structural restraint, the purpose of the Establishment Clause 
is not to safeguard individual religious rights.  That is the role of the Free Exercise Clause, indeed its 
singular role.  Even in archetypal no-establishment cases . . . the Court has applied the Establishment 
Clause not to relieve individual complainants of religious coercion or religious harm, but to keep in 
proper relationship two centers of authority: government and religion.”). 
 9. See generally Timothy E. Flanigan, Smith and Lemon: Carried About with Every Wind of 
Doctrine, 1994 PUB. INT. L. REV. 75 (1994).  See e.g. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 607–08 
(1971); Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 872 (1990). 
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the current one and emphasizes the critical statements by the Trump 
Administration.  Section II.B takes a closer look at Free Exercise claims 
generally, the framework used to decide them, and the levels of scrutiny 
applied to laws that are accused of violating the First Amendment. It also 
looks at the traditional use of the rational basis test and strict scrutiny, and 
how government statements have played into the analysis in these cases.  
Lastly, it considers Masterpiece as a point of comparison to Trump. 
A. Establishment Clause Analysis 
Generally, courts analyze Establishment Clause cases using the test 
set out by the Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman.10  There, the Court considered 
the constitutionality of Rhode Island statutes that provided aid to religious 
schools.11  Ultimately, the Court used a three-prong test to decide that the 
statutes indeed violated the Establishment Clause.12  Under the Lemon test, 
a statute or other government action must (1) have a “secular legislative 
purpose,” (2) have a “primary effect . . . [that] neither advances nor 
inhibits religion,” and (3) not foster an “excessive government 
entanglement with religion.”13  The first prong requires that a government 
action have some secular purpose, but not necessarily that the purpose is 
“solely secular.”14  However, the Court has noted that “[w]hile the Court 
is normally deferential to a State’s articulation of a secular purpose, it is 
required that the statement of such purpose be sincere and not a sham.”15  
Even if the purpose is considered secular, the second prong prohibits 
government action that has the effect of showing a preference for or a 
condemnation of any religion.16  The third prong then disallows 
government action that leads to excessive entanglement with religion, 
especially considering the character of the institution that benefits from 
the government action.17 
 
 10. Marcia S. Alembik, Note, The Future of the Lemon Test: A Sweeter Alternative for 
Establishment Clause Analysis, 40 GA. L. REV. 1171, 1173–74 (2006) (quoting Brett G. Scharffs, Do 
Displays of the Ten Commandments on Public Property Violate the Establishment Clause?, 2004-05 
PREVIEW U.S. SUP. CT. CAS. 298, 305); see Gary J. Simson, The Establishment Clause in the Supreme 
Court: Rethinking the Court’s Approach, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 905 (1987) (breaking down the Lemon 
test and components of judicial review for cases involving religious freedoms). 
 11. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 607–08.  
 12. Id. at 625; Simson, supra note 10 at 905–06. 
 13. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612–13 (internal citations omitted).  
 14. Alembik, supra note 10, at 1178. 
 15. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 586–87 (1987). 
 16. Alembik, supra note 10, at 1179. 
 17. Id.  
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1. Trump v. Hawaii 
a. The Proclamations 
Just days after entering office, President Trump issued the executive 
order that would become the first of three iterations of the “Muslim Ban.”18  
The Ban played a major role in Trump’s presidential campaign and 
enacting it fulfilled an important campaign promise.19  The executive 
order, and the subsequent versions of it, became known as the “Muslim 
Ban” because Trump first referred to his idea of the Ban by calling for “a 
total and complete shutdown” of Muslims entering the United States and 
because the President himself originally used this term.20  Shortly after the 
issuance of the first order, Rudy Guiliani, advisor to the President, told 
Fox News: “So when [Trump] first announced it, he said ‘Muslim ban.’  
He called me up.  He said, ‘Put a commission together.  Show me the right 
way to do it legally.’”21  The President reiterated his call for the “shutdown 
of Muslims entering the United States” on numerous occasions,22 and in 
April 2018 called the statement “nothing to apologize for.”23 
The first executive order banned, for ninety days, citizens of seven 
predominantly Muslim countries from entering the United States.24  The 
original executive order was effectively struck down in Washington v. 
Trump, which ended with a “temporary restraining order blocking the 
 
 18. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2417 (2018); see Exec. Order No. 13769, 82 Fed. Reg. 
8977 (Jan. 27, 2017); Exec. Order No. 13780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 (Mar. 6, 2017); Exec. Order No. 
13780, 82 Fed. Reg. 27965 (June 14, 2017).   
 19. Trump’s Campaign Promises - Has He Delivered on Them?, BBC NEWS (Dec. 24, 2018), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-37982000 [https://perma.cc/3DRC-NJHP].  
 20. Johnson, supra note 1; Trump: You Learn Very Little from Tax Returns, They Are 
‘Meaningless,’ FOX NEWS (Jan. 23, 2017), https://www.foxnews.com/transcript/trump-you-learn-ver 
y-little-from-tax-returns-they-are-meaningless [https://perma.cc/LZL8-62SZ] (transcript of Trump’s 
interview by Greta Van Susteren on May 11, 2016) (“We are going to put together a group of probably 
five or six people.  Very, very highly thought of people.  And I think Rudy will head it up.  And we’ll 
look at the Muslim ban or temporary ban as we call it.”); see Presidential Candidate, supra note 1. 
 21. Jenna Johnson, ‘I Think Islam Hates Us’: A Timeline of Trump’s Comments about Islam and 
Muslims, WASH. POST (May 20, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2017 
/05/20/i-think-islam-hates-us-a-timeline-of-trumps-comments-about-islam-and-muslims/?utm_term= 
.cfb22992ebd2 [https://perma.cc/3PUV-7ZRZ]. 
 22. Id.  
 23. The President’s News Conference with President Muhammadu Buhari of Nigeria, 2018 
DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 278 (Apr. 30, 2018), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/DCPD-
201800278/pdf/DCPD-201800278.pdf [https://perma.cc/4LKT-PZFC]; Adam Liptak, ‘There’s No 
Reason to Apologize’ for Muslim Ban Remarks, Trump Says, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 30, 2018), https://www 
.nytimes.com/2018/04/30/us/politics/trump-supreme-court-muslim-ban.html [https://perma.cc/C2LZ 
-7SGQ]. 
 24. Exec. Order No. 13769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017); Jennifer Lee Barrows, Trump’s 
Travel Ban: Lawful but Ill-Advised, 41 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 691, 692 (2018). 
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entry restrictions.”25  The President then replaced that executive order with 
a new one, Executive Order No. 13780.26  The new executive order banned 
all of the same countries as the first, except for Iraq, and banned entry of 
all refugees for 120 days, with case by case waivers.27 Further, after the 
second executive order was signed, “the White House Press Secretary told 
reporters that . . . President Trump ‘continue[d] to deliver on . . . his most 
significant campaign promises.’”28  Moreover, President Trump stated, “I 
keep my campaign promises, and our citizens will be very happy when 
they see the result.”29  That “campaign promise,” as worded by the Trump 
campaign, was the “total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the 
United States.”30 
Both orders also called for a review “to examine the adequacy of 
information provided by foreign governments about their nationals 
seeking to enter the United States.”31  After completion of that review, the 
President issued the Proclamation that is the subject of Trump v. Hawaii, 
Proclamation No. 9645.32  This version of the Ban “placed entry 
restrictions on the nationals of eight foreign states.”33  As with the previous 
two bans, most of the countries banned by the Proclamation have 
predominantly-Muslim populations.34  However, Venezuela and North 
Korea were also added.35  President Trump referred to the Proclamation 
being reviewed by the Court as a “watered down, politically correct 
version” of the “original Travel Ban.”36  Shortly after issuance of the 
Proclamation, the President retweeted a series of anti-Muslim videos, 
which the White House Deputy Press Secretary related to the 
Proclamation, stating that the “President has been talking about these 
security issues for years now, from the campaign trail to the White House” 
 
 25. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2403 (2018); Washington v. Trump, No. c17-0141JLR, 
2017 WL 462040, at *7–8 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2017); Barrows, supra note 24 at 693. 
 26. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2403–04; see Exec. Order No. 13780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 (Mar. 6, 2017). 
 27. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2404; 82 Fed. Reg. at 13213–15. 
 28. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2437 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 29. Id.  
 30. Johnson, supra note 1; Peter Margulies, The Travel Ban Decision, Administrative Law, and 
Judicial Method: Taking Statutory Context Seriously, 33 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 159, 173 (2019); see also 
Presidential Candidate, supra note 1. 
 31. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2403–04. 
 32. 82 Fed. Reg. 45161 (Sept. 27, 2017).  
 33. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2404.  
 34. Id. at 2421.  
 35. Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. at 45164; Jeffrey F. Addicott, The Trump Travel Ban: 
Rhetoric vs Reality, 44 DAYTON L. REV. 491, 502 (2019). 
 36. Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (June 5, 2017, 3:29 AM), https://twitter.com 
/realDonaldTrump/status/871675245043888128?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7C
twterm%5E871675245043888128&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2F [https://perma.cc/75LM-K77P].  
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and “has addressed these issues with the travel order that he issued earlier 
this year and the companion proclamation.”37 
The Proclamation also included case-by-case waivers and 
exemptions.38  However, the evidence at this point appears to show that 
the waivers and exemptions may not be applied in practice.39  For example, 
in the Proclamation’s first month 6,555 applicants were eligible for a 
waiver but only two waivers were approved.40  Similarly, although the 
Proclamation purports to exempt refugees or asylum seekers, few were 
actually admitted entry to the United States.41  The same is true for 
individuals applying for a number of types of nonimmigrant visas, which 
were also purportedly exempt from the Ban.42  Additionally, other 
anecdotal evidence cited by the dissent in Trump suggests that the waiver 
provision is perhaps an empty promise.43 
b. The Case 
Trump v. Hawaii considers the constitutionality of the third version of 
the “Muslim Ban,” Proclamation No. 9645.44  The plaintiffs in this case 
challenged the Proclamation on multiple grounds,45 but this Note is 
focused on the claim that the Proclamation is unconstitutionally based on 
the object of banning Muslims from the United States, violating the 
Establishment Clause.46 
In deciding not to invalidate the Proclamation, the Court focused on 
the unique nature of this First Amendment claim, stating that “[u]nlike the 
typical suit involving religious displays or school prayer, plaintiffs seek to 
invalidate a national security directive regulating the entry of aliens 
abroad.”47  The Court then noted that the Proclamation is facially neutral 
and reasoned that based on the Court’s immigration jurisprudence, the 
Court’s “inquiry into matters of entry and national security is highly 
 
 37. See Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2438 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted).  
 38. Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. at 45165. 
 39. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2431 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 2432.  
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 2417; see generally, THE PENN STATE LAW CTR. FOR IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS CLINIC, 
UPDATED FACT SHEET: MUSLIM BAN CASES AT THE SUPREME COURT (2017), https://pennstatelaw.ps 
u.edu/sites/default/files/pictures/faculty/Muslim%20Ban%20Fact%20Sheet%206.30.17.pdf [https://p 
erma.cc/U696-NUXW]. 
 45. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2406. 
 46. Id. at 2415–16.  
 47. Id. at 2418.  
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constrained.”48  The Court further reasoned that due to the touch of 
immigration law in this case, it could uphold the law purely because it is 
facially neutral, but decides not to, and to instead apply rational basis 
review, because the government conceded that it might be appropriate 
here.49  The Court, therefore, asked whether the only purpose of the 
Proclamation was a “bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular 
group.”50  The Court found that the Proclamation had “legitimate 
grounding in national security concerns” and upheld the Proclamation as 
constitutional.51 
B. Free Exercise Clause Analysis 
Two seminal cases have made the framework for answering First 
Amendment questions involving the free exercise of religion especially 
clear:52 Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon 
v. Smith,53 and Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah.54  
Sections II.B.1 and II.B.2 of this Note explore these cases and their 
framework for Free Exercise claims, looking closely at strict scrutiny and 
rational basis review.  Then, Section II.B.3 introduces the Court’s recent 
case, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 
and its more traditional application of the Free Exercise Clause. 
The general framework for analyzing First Amendment claims, Free 
Exercise claims in particular, is a two-level system.  First, the court decides 
what level of scrutiny it should use to analyze the law plaintiffs claim 
violated the First Amendment.55  This tier of the analysis asks whether the 
law is facially neutral, and if so, then the court applies a lower level of 
review known as rational basis, or in some cases, rational basis with bite.56  
If the law singles out a group of people on impermissible grounds, then 
the court must apply strict scrutiny, which, as the name suggests, is a more 
rigid test which a law is much less likely to pass.57  The second step in the 
 
 48. Id. at 2419–20 (citing Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81–82 (1976)).  
 49. Id. at 2420. 
 50. Id. (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)). 
 51. Id. at 2421. 
 52. Julia E. Pusateri, Note, Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah and the 
Burdening of Free Exercise: The Solidification of the Employment Division v. Smith Doctrine and 
the Congressional Response, 38 ST. LOUIS L.J. 1041, 1041–42. 
 53. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 54. 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
 55. See, e.g., Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 531. 
 56. Miranda Oshige McGowan, Lifting the Veil on Rigorous Rational Basis Scrutiny, 96 MARQ. 
L. REV. 377, 381–82 (2012).  
 57. Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 531–32; see also Kenneth Marin, Note, Employment Division v. 
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analysis is for the court to apply the appropriate test to the challenged 
law.58  If the law fits all the requirements of the applied test, it is upheld, 
and if it does not, it fails and is thus unconstitutional.59  
1. Employment Division v. Smith and Rational Basis 
In Employment Division v. Smith, the Respondents were fired because 
of their sacramental use of the hallucinogenic drug peyote as part of a 
ceremony at their Native American Church.60  The Respondents sued after 
the State of Oregon refused to grant them unemployment benefits, finding 
that they were fired for “work-related misconduct.”61  Smith argued that 
because the criminalization of peyote burdened his ability to practice his 
religion, the law was unconstitutional.62  The Court disagreed.63  Instead, 
the Court found that “generally applicable, religion-neutral laws that have 
the effect of burdening a particular religious practice need not be justified 
[under the free exercise of religion clause of the Federal Constitution’s 
First Amendment,] by a compelling governmental interest.”64  That is, 
where a law or government action is facially neutral, the court need not 
apply strict scrutiny.65  The Court elaborated, stating that: 
[T]he “exercise of religion” often involves not only belief and profession 
but the performance of (or abstention from) physical acts: assembling 
with others for a worship service, participating in sacramental use of 
bread and wine, proselytizing, abstaining from certain foods or certain 
modes of transportation.  It would be true, we think (though no case of 
ours has involved the point), that a State would be “prohibiting the free 
exercise [of religion]” if it sought to ban such acts or abstentions only 
when they are engaged in for religious reasons, or only because of the 
religious belief that they display.  It would doubtless be unconstitutional, 
 
Smith: The Supreme Court Alters the State of Free Exercise Doctrine, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 1431, 1432 
(1991) (“In doing so, the Supreme Court effectively limited first amendment strict scrutiny to 
situations in which the government singles out a particular religion and intentionally limits the rights 
of its members.”). 
 58. Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 531–32. 
 59. Id.  Both Smith and Babalu Aye were superseded by the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 
and now by its replacement the Religious Land Use and Institutionalize Persons Act for local zoning 
restrictions and for inmates.  Moorish Sci. Temple of Am., Inc. v. Thompson, No. 2014-CA-001080-
MR, 2016 WL 1403495, at *3 (Ky. App. Apr. 8, 2016) (unreported) (“With the passage of the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (‘RFRA’) . . . and its replacement, the Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act (‘RLUIPA’) . . . such a test has been superseded.”).  See generally Holt 
v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853 (2015).  
 60. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990). 
 61. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 62. Id. at 875.  
 63. Id. at 890.  
 64. Id. at 886 n.3. 
 65. Id. 
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for example, to ban the casting of “statues that are to be used for worship 
purposes,” or to prohibit bowing down before a golden calf.66 
What the Court did not do in Smith, however, was directly apply the 
rational basis test as we know it today.67  At least, not in the same terms.68  
Instead, the Court simply stated that “[b]ecause respondents’ ingestion of 
peyote was prohibited under Oregon law, and because that prohibition is 
constitutional,” the refusal of employment benefits was not prohibited by 
the Constitution.69 
Rational basis review has its own line of jurisprudence, dating back to 
1914.70  The test for rational basis review provides that “if a law neither 
burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold the 
legislative classification so long as it bears a rational relation to some 
legitimate end.”71  There are then two essential questions involved in the 
application of rational basis review.72  First, does the law burden a 
fundamental right or target a suspect class?  If the answer to this question 
is yes, the court applies strict scrutiny.73  If the answer is no, the Court 
moves on to the second question: does the law at issue bear “a rational 
relation to some legitimate end[?]”74  The Court has also applied what is 
typically known as the rigorous rational basis test or rational basis with 
bite, although it has not formally accepted it as a separate test from the 
usual rational basis.75  When the Court uses the more rigorous test, it looks 
more deeply into the State’s motivation for the law at issue, even where 
 
 66. Id. at 877–78. 
 67. See id. at 883–84. 
 68. Id.  
 69. Id. at 890.  
 70. Nicholas Walter, The Utility of Rational Basis Review, 63 VILL. L. REV. 79, 83–84 (2018) 
(“The first appearance of the ‘rational basis’ language in the Supreme Court came in the 1914 case of 
Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Brickell.  There, the Court upheld against an equal protection challenge 
an Alabama statute that provided that itinerant sellers of sewing machines should pay an annual tax 
for each county in which they operated, but non-itinerant sellers of sewing machines should not pay a 
tax.  The Court noted that there was an evident difference between selling sewing machines as an 
itinerant merchant and doing so from a fixed establishment, and it was unable to say that this 
distinction was ‘arbitrar[y].’” (citations omitted)).  
 71. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 630,  631 (1996); see also James M. McGoldrick, Jr., The Rational 
Basis Test and Why It Is So Irrational: An Eighty-Year Retrospective, 55 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 751, 771 
(2018) (“[W]ith the rational basis test, the Court appears to invent ways the law might advance the 
legitimate end—whether realistic or not. . . .  [T]he Court is clear that the rational basis test does not 
require any consideration as to whether other alternatives might better address the problem.”). 
 72. Romer, 517 U.S. at 631.  
 73. Id.  
 74. Id.; see also John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2451 (2003) 
(“[A] court must give effect to a rational classification even if it is to some extent both underinclusive 
and overinclusive in relation to its apparent purpose.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 75. McGowan, supra note 57, at 381–82 (“The Supreme Court, however, has never squarely 
admitted—and indeed, has sometimes denied—that a rigorous form of rational basis scrutiny exists.”). 
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that law is facially neutral.76 
For example, in Plyler v. Doe, the Court struck down a Texas law that 
refused funding to schools for the education of undocumented immigrants 
as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.77  Even though the law did 
not target a suspect class or burden a fundamental right, the Court refused 
to accept Texas’s flawed reasoning for the law as a rational basis 
reasonably related to a legitimate aim.78  The State alleged that the 
reasoning for the law was “to protect itself from an influx of” 
undocumented immigrants.79  The Court, however, stated that “[t]here is 
no evidence in the record suggesting that illegal entrants impose any 
significant burden on the State’s economy.  To the contrary, the available 
evidence suggests that illegal aliens underutilize public services, while 
contributing their labor to the local economy and tax money to the state 
fisc.”80  In Plyler, the Court, applying rational basis review, did not merely 
accept the purpose asserted by the government without question because 
there was little evidence to support a finding that the law actually pursued 
some legitimate state goal.81  Instead, the glaring mismatch between ends 
and means in this case led the Court to strike down the law.82 
2. Babalu Aye and Strict Scrutiny 
Yet another test the Court may use to analyze a First Amendment 
claim is strict scrutiny.83  Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of 
Haileah provides a remarkable example of this analysis where the Court 
considers government statements.  Babalu Aye addressed the 
constitutionality of four Florida city ordinances making animal sacrifice 
punishable by fines up to five hundred dollars, sixty days of imprisonment, 
 
 76. Id. at 383–84 (“As with strict and intermediate scrutiny, when the Court applies rigorous 
rational basis scrutiny it presumes that the legislation is unconstitutional.  The state must prove that 
the law has a legitimate state purpose and that the classification furthers the state interest.  As with 
strict and intermediate scrutiny, not all state interests suffice to discharge the state’s burden.  Moral 
objections to the group’s conduct or to the group itself, under-inclusive or over-inclusive justifications 
will not discharge the state’s burden.” (citations omitted)). 
 77. 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982). 
 78. Id. at 228–29. 
 79. Id. at 228. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id.  
 82. Id. at 230. 
 83. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546 (1993); Kenji 
Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 756 (2011) (“The Supreme Court has 
formally accorded heightened scrutiny to classifications based on five characteristics––race, national 
origin, alienage, sex, and nonmarital parentage.” (internal citations omitted)). 
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or both.84  The petitioner, Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, and its members 
practiced the Santeria religion, and used animal sacrifice as a form of 
devotion.85  Because the ordinances would punish the practice of the 
Church’s religion, the Church challenged them as a violation of the First 
Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause.86 
In Babalu Aye, the Court began its analysis by addressing whether the 
ordinances at issue are neutral and of general applicability.87  Importantly, 
the Court noted that “[n]eutrality and general applicability are interrelated, 
and, as becomes apparent in this case, failure to satisfy one requirement is 
a likely indication that the other has not been satisfied.”88  In deciding 
whether a law is neutral, Babalu Aye reasoned that where the purpose of a 
law is to inhibit actions or “practices because of their religious motivation, 
the law is” not considered neutral.89 
The Court continued to discuss the multiple avenues used to determine 
the object or purpose of a law.90  First and foremost, the analysis should 
consider the text of the law and whether it is discriminatory on its face, 
explaining that a law “lacks facial neutrality if it refers to a religious 
practice without a secular meaning discernable from the language or 
context.”91  However, the Court made it incredibly clear that facial 
neutrality is not enough to prove that a law actually has a neutral purpose, 
stating that: 
Facial neutrality is not determinative.  The Free Exercise Clause, like the 
Establishment Clause, extends beyond facial discrimination.  The Clause 
“forbids subtle departures from neutrality” . . . and “covert suppression 
of particular religious beliefs . . . .”  Official action that targets religious 
conduct for distinctive treatment cannot be shielded by mere compliance 
with the requirement of facial neutrality.  The Free Exercise Clause 
protects against governmental hostility which is masked, as well as overt.  
 
 84. Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 528 (“All ordinances and resolutions passed the city council by 
unanimous vote.  Violations of each of the four ordinances were punishable by fines not exceeding 
$500 or imprisonment not exceeding [sixty] days, or both.”).  
 85. Id. at 524.  
 86. Id. at 528. 
 87. Id. at 531 (“In addressing the constitutional protection for free exercise of religion, our cases 
establish the general proposition that a law that is neutral and of general applicability need not be 
justified by a compelling governmental interest even if the law has the incidental effect of burdening 
a particular religious practice.”); see Brian A. Freeman, Trends in First Amendment Jurisprudence: 
Expiating the Sins of Yoder and Smith: Toward a Unified Theory of First Amendment Exemptions 
From Neutral Laws of General Applicability, 66 MO. L. REV. 9, 18 (2001) (“Of particular importance 
in Babalu Aye is that, for the first time in a First Amendment religion case, the Court attempted to 
define precisely the meaning of neutral and generally applicable.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 88. Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 531.  
 89. Id. at 533.  
 90. Id.   
 91. Id.   
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“The Court must survey meticulously the circumstances of governmental 
categories to eliminate, as it were, religious gerrymanders.”92 
Thus, the Court went on to state that even if the law is facially neutral, 
the analysis should consider “the effect of a law in its real operation,” 
which is also considered “strong evidence of its object.”93  For example, 
in Babalu Aye, the prohibition on killing animals was interpreted by the 
government to include religious animal sacrifice, but exclude most other 
killings.94  Thus, although the prohibition itself was worded neutrally, in 
practice, it targeted those of the Santeria religion.95 
The Court also considered the relation of the law to the proposed 
governmental interest.96  To be considered neutral in purpose, the law at 
issue must relate to the legitimate governmental interest and cannot be 
over or under inclusive.97  Here, for example, the proposed governmental 
interest was to prevent cruelty to animals and protect public health.98  
However, the Court reasoned that “[i]f improper disposal, not the sacrifice 
itself, is the harm to be prevented, the city could have imposed a general 
regulation on the disposal of organic garbage,” and that “[w]ith regard to 
the city’s interest in ensuring the adequate care of animals, regulation of 
conditions and treatment, regardless of why an animal is kept, is the logical 
response to the city’s concern, not a prohibition on possession for the 
purpose of sacrifice.”99 
The Babalu Aye Court further looked to Equal Protection cases for 
guidance, importantly noting: 
Relevant evidence includes, among other things, the historical 
background of the decision under challenge, the specific series of events 
leading to the enactment or official policy in question, and the legislative 
or administrative history, including contemporaneous statements made 
by members of the decisionmaking body.  These objective factors bear 
on the question of discriminatory object.100 
Here, the Court looked to the events leading up to the ordinances as 
 
 92. Id. at 534 (citing Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 452 (1971); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 
693, 703 (1986); Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y. City, 397 U.S. 664, 696 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) 
(internal quotations omitted)). 
 93. Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 535.  
 94. Id. at 535.  
 95. Id. at 542. 
 96. Id. at 538–39. 
 97. Id. at 533–34.  
 98. Id. at 538. 
 99. Id. at 538–39. 
 100. Id. at 540. 
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evidence of their discriminatory intent.101  Specifically, the Court found 
that because no discussion of animal sacrifice happened in the city council 
until the Church announced its opening and because councilmembers and 
residents made discriminatory comments about the religion and how to 
stop the Church from opening during a recorded session, there was 
significant evidence to show that the purpose of the ordinances was not 
neutral.102  Because the ordinances were not neutral, the Court applied 
strict scrutiny, a test in which the government action at issue is only 
constitutional if the government can show that it is “narrowly tailored” and 
advances “interests of the highest order.”103 
3. Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission. 
In Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission the 
Court took an entirely different tone than in Trump.104  The controversy at 
the core of Masterpiece began when Jack Phillips, the owner of a bakery 
in Colorado, refused to bake a wedding cake for a gay couple.105  After the 
refusal, the couple filed a complaint at the Colorado Civil Rights 
Commission based on a Colorado law prohibiting discrimination based on 
sexual orientation in businesses that sell goods or offer services to the 
public.106  The administrative law judge at the Commission hearing ruled 
in the couple’s favor, finding that the baker’s First Amendment rights 
would not have been violated by having to bake a cake for the couple, and 
ultimately, the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.107 
While the Court in Masterpiece recognized that laws protecting gay 
persons and gay couples are often not considered unconstitutional, it found 
that in this case, the Commission “showed elements of a clear and 
impermissible hostility toward the sincere religious beliefs motivating [the 
baker’s] objection.”108  The Court found the Commission’s decision 
impermissible based on two grounds.109  First, some Commissioners made 
statements about the baker’s religion during the public hearing on the 
 
 101. Id. at 540–41. 
 102. Id. at 541–42. 
 103. Id. at 546 (quoting McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 628 (1978)). 
 104. See generally 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018); Mark Strasser, Masterpiece of Misdirection, 76 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 963 (2019).  
 105. Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1720. 
 106. Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act, COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-601 (2016); Masterpiece, 138 
S. Ct. at 1720.   
 107. Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1726–27.  
 108. Id. at 1721.  
 109. Id. at 1731. 
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matter.110  Second, the Commission had treated cases of refusal to put anti-
gay statements on cakes differently than the case at hand.111  Importantly, 
the Court in Masterpiece considered the above points (the statements and 
unequal treatment) as evidence of a lack of neutrality, despite the neutral 
text of the law.112 
III. ANALYSIS 
The decision in Trump, especially as compared to Masterpiece, raises 
important questions about the Court’s use of government statements in 
Establishment and Free Exercise Clause claims and of its eagerness to 
ignore such statements when “national security” is the justification of the 
government.  This Note argues first that Trump’s analysis under the 
Establishment Clause is unusual, and the case would have been more aptly 
analyzed under the Free Exercise Clause.  Second, it argues that even 
under the Establishment Clause framework, the Proclamation should not 
have been upheld.  Third, this Note analyzes Trump under the Free 
Exercise Clause, arguing that the statements in Trump are no different than 
those in Free Exercise cases where the Court found the government action 
unconstitutional.  Lastly, this Note argues that when cases like Trump arise 
in the future, courts should analyze them under the Free Exercise Clause 
and not the Establishment Clause.  Further, in this analysis, the Court 
should avoid an overly broad loophole which would make executive action 
essentially unreviewable when immigration is at issue.  Cases where the 
Executive has such great power should, in the future, be reviewed with 
some scrutiny, especially when that executive repeatedly makes remarks 
about his disdain for a particular suspect class.  The Court’s decision, 
therefore, should not be read broadly to destroy all meaningful review of 
executive actions which are purportedly based on national security.  Such 
a reading could have disastrous results. 
A. Because Trump Involved Government Animus Towards Religion, It 
Should Have Been Analyzed as a Free Exercise Claim, Rather Than an 
Establishment Clause Claim. 
Some of the peculiarity of Trump likely stems from the fact that 
despite looking more like the traditional Free Exercise claim, it was 
brought and analyzed as an Establishment Clause claim.113  Generally, the 
 
 110. Id. at 1721. 
 111. Id. at 1730. 
 112. Id. at 1722. 
 113. See supra Section II.A.2. 
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Establishment Clause is invoked against government action that benefits a 
religion or religious organization.114  The Lemon test itself seems to 
indicate that this is the case.115  For example, the entanglement prong of 
the test seems designed to deal with situations in which the government 
somehow advances a religious institution.116  Conversely, it hardly makes 
sense to ask if a government action seeking to condemn or marginalize a 
religion somehow creates excessive entanglement with religion, as this 
would almost certainly never be the case.  The government action at issue 
in Trump does not seek to advance any religion, nor does it benefit any 
religious institution, as is typically the case with Establishment Clause 
cases.117  Instead, it looks factually much more like the Free Exercise cases 
discussed above, including Masterpiece, which typically involve 
government action against a religion and which take the government 
statements surrounding the action very seriously.118  Further, the Court 
adds to the confusion by not applying the Lemon test, as is the usual case 
for Establishment claims, but rather, applying rational basis review, which 
is generally used in Free Exercise claims. 
The eventual Establishment Clause claim likely stems from some 
avoidance of standing issues in the claim.  Because the alleged Free 
Exercise violation occurred against people who were likely not U.S. 
citizens and were not in the United States, it may have been difficult to 
show that those prohibited from entering the United States had standing to 
sue.119  It seems that the decision to bring the claim under the 
Establishment Clause, with plaintiffs alleging injury in the form of the 
exclusion of their relatives by the Proclamation, may have been a litigation 
choice made to avoid these issues.120  Assuming standing requirements 
could be met, a Free Exercise claim would make much more sense, as 
shown below.  However, even under traditional Establishment Clause 
analysis, the Proclamation should have been considered unconstitutional 
because it has the effect of excluding a religion. 
 
 114. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
 115. Id. at 612.  
 116. Id. at 612–14. 
 117. See generally Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).  
 118. See supra Section II.B. 
 119. See Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2416; see also Earl M. Maltz, The Constitution and the Trump Travel 
Ban, 22 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 391, 406–07 (2018).  Cf. Ryan M. Mardini, Note, The “Muslim Ban” 
and the Constitutional Crisis, 96 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 225, 248 (2019) (“But why is the 
Establishment Clause a much better avenue of challenging the order?  The Establishment Clause 
prohibits government preferentialism of one religion over another, providing a natural foundation for 
a constitutional claim.”). 
 120. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2416. 
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B. The Proclamation Fails the Lemon Test, Which Would Usually Be 
Applied in an Establishment Clause Case. 
The fact that the plaintiffs in Trump based their claim in the 
Establishment Clause is peculiar, although perhaps necessary, on its own.  
However, it is the Court’s failure to actually apply the traditional 
Establishment Clause framework that completely muddles the decision. 
Ideally, the Court would have analyzed Trump under the Free Exercise 
analysis explored below.  But even if the Court had used the Lemon test, 
as it does in other Establishment Clause cases, the Proclamation likely 
would have been ruled unconstitutional based, at the very least, on its 
practical effect. 
The Proclamation may arguably not even meet the first prong of the 
Lemon test, secular purpose. Although the Proclamation does have the 
purported secular purpose of increasing national security, a court could 
find that this is a “sham.”121  Of course, this would require the Court to 
give quite a bit of weight to Trump’s statements about the Ban, which it 
seems reluctant to do, especially when national security is at issue.122  But, 
even if the Proclamation passed the first prong, it would almost certainly 
fail the second, which requires that the practical effect of government 
action is not to condemn a religion.123  The Proclamation is, in effect, the 
“Muslim Ban” that Trump proposed during his campaign.  While the 
Trump Administration has certainly dressed up the Proclamation in an 
attempt to avoid judicial scrutiny, the outcome of its terms is to merely ban 
citizens of predominantly-Muslim countries from entering the United 
States without any evidence that they have any connection to terrorism or 
present a threat to the United States.124  The third prong of the Lemon test 
is nearly impossible to apply to Trump because the Proclamation does not 
benefit a religion or religious institution, but it is also not necessary to 
apply due to the failure at prong two. 
C. Applying the Free Exercise Clause to the Proclamation. 
Two aspects of the Proclamation make it unlikely that the Court could 
find the government acted constitutionally under the traditional Free 
Exercise analysis which it should have applied.  First, as was the case in 
 
 121. Cf. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 586–87 (1987) (“While the Court is normally 
deferential to a State’s articulation of a secular purpose, it is required that the statement of such purpose 
be sincere and not a sham.”). 
 122. See Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2416. 
 123. Alembik, supra note 10, at 1179. 
 124. See infra notes 138–60 and accompanying text.  
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Masterpiece, the Court would likely find that statements of Trump and 
members of his campaign make it clear that the Proclamation had a 
discriminatory object.  Second, and again as in most Free Exercise cases, 
the Court would have considered the mismatch between the purported 
intent of the Proclamation and its actual effect as applied. 
1. Statements as Evidence of Neutrality 
One unresolved question from Trump is the weight the Court gives to 
statements by government officials. In Trump, the Court emphasized that 
the Proclamation is “facially neutral toward religion.”125  And, in deciding 
which level of scrutiny to apply, the Court did not consider the anti-
Muslim statements of the Trump Administration.126  But, in Masterpiece, 
although the text of the regulations in Colorado was facially neutral 
towards religion, as was the Proclamation, the same Court viewed the 
government statements in that case as evidence that the government did 
not act neutrally.127  Yet, the statements in Trump, if analyzed in the usual 
manner, almost certainly show a lack of neutrality on the part of the 
government.  In Masterpiece, the problematic statement that proved a lack 
of neutrality was a commission member stating that he found using one’s 
religion to discriminate against gay people “despicable.”128  This is 
comparable to statements like “Islam hates us” or “shutdown of Muslims 
entering the United States.”129  Further, the President’s statements are 
perhaps even more evidence of a lack of neutrality than those in 
Masterpiece because he is the sole executive issuing the executive orders 
at issue, while in Masterpiece, there was more than one Commissioner 
making the decision.  The President’s statements also span months before, 
during, and after all three versions of the Ban, and explicitly state that each 
version had the same purpose as the first, which he called a “Muslim Ban” 
himself.130 
A comparison of Trump to Babalu Aye and Smith further show how, 
if the court had applied its usual analysis, the Proclamation likely would 
not have been upheld.  First, the Court in Smith, applied rational basis 
 
 125. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2418. 
 126. Id. at 2418–20. 
 127. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1729 (2018).  
 128. Id.  
 129. Johnson, supra note 21; Liptak, supra note 23; Presidential Candidate, supra note 1; 
Theodore Schleifer, Donald Trump: ‘I Think Islam Hates Us,’ CNN (Mar. 10, 2016, 5:56 PM), https:// 
www.cnn.com/2016/03/09/politics/donald-trump-islam-hates-us/ [https://perma.cc/ZKZ6-AHMV].  
But cf. Addicott, supra note 35 at 525–26 (discussing disagreement among members of the Supreme 
Court over whether Trump’s statements are evidence of animus or an unorthodox speaking style). 
 130. Johnson, supra note 21.  
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review to review a ban on smoking peyote because the Court found that 
law was indeed neutral and “generally applicable.”131  There were no 
statements from the government suggesting that the ban on the drug was 
motivated by animus towards a particular religion, nor was there evidence 
that the law was unfairly applied to religious people.132  The lack of  factors 
showing an impermissible purpose makes Smith wholly different from 
Trump, and suggests that, had the Court applied the Free Exercise analysis 
in Trump, it would have applied some heightened scrutiny.  This was the 
case in Babalu Aye, which is much more similar to Trump than Smith.133  
There, even though the law was facially neutral and applied to everyone, 
the government had made statements that suggested it was really a way to 
stop the building of a church.134  The Court there emphatically stated that 
“facial neutrality is not determinative,”135 and that the First Amendment 
forbids “covert suppression of particular religious beliefs.”136  The 
Proclamation would not pass the test set out in Babalu Aye because the 
President’s consistent and discriminatory statements make it highly 
unlikely that the Proclamation is neutral.  Under a Babalu Aye standard, 
the Court would have applied strict scrutiny, especially considering the 
application of the Proclamation in practice. 
2. Application as Evidence of Neutrality 
Another area in which the Court’s treatment of Masterpiece and 
Trump differs is in reviewing the laws at issue as they are applied.  The 
Court in Masterpiece points to an unfair application of the law by the 
Commission as evidence of a lack of neutrality on the part of the 
Government.137  Just as with the statements, this may well be the case with 
the Proclamation, too.138  The Proclamation is for the supposed purpose of 
national security, but it would be wildly over-inclusive to deem every 
single person from eight different nations––150 million people––a threat 
to national security.139  In fact, “no national from any of [the] countries 
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 132. See generally id.  
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[included in the Ban] has caused any of the terrorism-related deaths in the 
United States since 1975.”140  The application of waivers and exemptions 
would alleviate this over-inclusiveness, suggesting a more individual 
approach that indeed targeted dangerous people.141  However, the evidence 
indicates that these waivers are not actually being applied in a manner that 
would undo the over-inclusive nature of the Proclamation.142  Only around 
two percent of the waiver applications received through April 30, 2018 
were actually approved,143 and, as of the issuance of Trump, consular 
officials had not even received any guidance on how or when to grant 
waiver applications.144  In other words, there is no transparent system even 
in place to apply the purported waivers,145 which would need to be 
extensive to avoid over-inclusivity.146 
Further, the Proclamation is under-inclusive because it does not ban 
individuals from the countries that have produced the most foreign-born 
terrorists.147  In fact, the country that is number one on the list of Country 
of Origin for most foreign-born terrorists responsible for the deaths of 
American citizens from 1975 to 2015, Saudi Arabia, is not included in the 
Proclamation.148  The countries included in the Ban are not even in the top 
twenty-five of that list.149  If the Proclamation actually sought to limit 
dangerous people coming to the United States, it should have banned the 
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countries statistically shown to have the most dangerous people.150  And, 
even soon after the issuance of the Proclamation, it was clear that not only 
did the Ban not achieve its purported goals, it actually did the opposite.151  
Chad, for example, offended by its inclusion in the Ban, removed its troops 
from Niger, where they were cooperating with a counterterrorism struggle 
against Boko Haram.152 
Some will likely point to the inclusion of Venezuela and North Korea, 
the only two non-majority-Muslim countries included in the Proclamation, 
as evidence that the Ban is not actually targeting Muslims.  But two 
important details make it clear these inclusions are likely a paper tiger, 
included only to skirt passed the scrutiny of the courts.  First, the two 
countries were only added after the first version of the Ban was struck 
down.153  Second, in practice, very few (if any) people from North Korea 
seek visas in the United States, and when it comes to Venezuela, the 
executive order only applies to “a handful of officials and their 
families.”154  The addition of these two countries thus has little to no 
practical effect on the outcome of the Proclamation, and the addition was 
made only after the failure of the first executive order in the Ninth 
Circuit,155 in Trump’s own words “water[ing] down” the Proclamation.156 
Thus, when one considers the statements of the Trump Administration 
and the practical effect of the Proclamation, it seems to be anything but 
neutral.  If the Court had analyzed the case under the more typical Free 
Exercise framework, like in Masterpiece, it almost certainly would not 
have been upheld.  However, the Court invokes the fact that the 
Proclamation is a “national security directive” as reasoning to not look 
beyond the face of the executive order at all and refuse to question the 
government’s purported purpose at all.157  But the Court then decides to 
apply rational basis review.158  The only explanation the Court gives for 
why it chose that level of review is that the government suggested that 
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looking beyond the face of the Proclamation may be appropriate.159  This 
is an odd and flawed approach, suggesting that whenever the President acts 
on admission and immigration matters, it cannot be questioned beyond the 
carefully planned text of the executive order (and Trump’s case, reissued 
three times to find just enough facial neutrality to calm the courts), unless 
the government allows a more in-depth analysis.  Instead, the statements 
behind the Proclamation and its unfair application should have triggered a 
higher level of review.  And even under rational basis review, these same 
factors would likely lead to the striking down of the Proclamation.160 
D. Immigration and National Security as an Overly Broad Loophole 
The Court in Trump invokes a number of cases involving immigration 
or national security to justify its claim that the Court need not look beyond 
the face of the Proclamation.161  The first of these cases is Kleindienst v. 
Mandel, in which a self-described Marxist and Belgian journalist was 
denied entry to the United States where he was going to speak at Stanford 
University.162  The students sued, alleging that their constitutional right to 
receive information had been infringed by the denial.163  A singular visa 
denial was also at issue in Kerry v. Din,164 where a woman and U.S. citizen 
sued based on a protected liberty interest in her marriage when her 
husband’s visa application was denied due to his connection to the 
Taliban.165  The Trump Court also invokes Fiallo v. Bell, where the Court 
considered a congressionally imposed definition of “parent” in 
immigration that discriminated on the basis of sex.166 
In all of these cases, the Court asked only whether the policy is 
“facially legitimate and bona fide.”167  Importantly, the first two of these 
cases apply only to a singular visa denial, based on direct and particular 
evidence that the person in question was a threat to the United States.168  
The third case applied to congressional action—passed by both the House 
and the Senate and signed by the President—which while discriminatory 
on the basis of sex, was most likely not based on an animus towards 
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men.169  These details are important to compare to the Proclamation at 
issue in Trump. 
The Court invokes the national security and immigration piece of the 
Proclamation, saying that it need not apply the traditional domestic 
Establishment Clause framework for this reason.170  Instead, the Court says 
it must only apply a very deferential test it previously applied to 
congressional acts and the denial of a single person’s visa.171  But the Court 
does not, in the end, apply that deferential test.  The Court instead decides 
to apply rational basis review.172  The Court does not explain its decision 
to apply rational basis review to the Trump Proclamation beyond stating 
that the government suggested it may be appropriate.173  This is perhaps 
the most confusing piece of the Trump decision: its use of immigration and 
national security to justify not looking beyond the face of the 
Proclamation, and what that means for future cases.  For this reason, the 
Court should seek to make several clarifications of its analysis here as 
future cases arise. 
First, the Court must clarify if a new category of cases now exists that 
is analyzed neither under the Immigration or Foreign Relations 
framework, which would apply a “facially legitimate and bona fide” 
standard,174 nor under the Establishment or Free Exercise Clause 
framework, which would apply the Lemon test or heightened scrutiny.  The 
Court here states that it need only apply the “facially legitimate and bona 
fide” standard, but then does not apply it. Future cases should help explain 
why the court did not apply that standard.  The Court must clarify what 
about the Trump case made it worthy of rational basis review.  Is it the 
case that only where the government itself expressly suggests or permits 
the court to look beyond a facial justification of national security, the Court 
will, but apart from that it will not?  Or is it something about the facts of 
this particular case that drove the Court to stray from what it says is the 
appropriate analysis?  If it is something about the facts, the Court should 
eventually elaborate on which facts led to that decision, and if other cases 
may also fit into this Immigration-Establishment Clause middle category. 
Second, the Court seems to suggest that it will not look beyond the 
face of any law that involves “admission and immigration” and “overlap[s] 
with ‘the area of national security.’”175  This category is vague, broad, and 
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2019] TRUMP V. HAWAII 373 
could very well include every immigration-related government action.  As 
future cases involving immigration arise, the Court should clarify, and 
hopefully narrow, the cases that would invoke such deferential treatment.  
This is especially important considering the Court’s opinion suggests that 
even facially discriminatory immigration measures can be upheld under 
Fiallo.176  Consider, for example, a travel ban that explicitly bans non-
citizen Muslims from entering the United States, which the President 
justifies with national security.  That case would look much like Trump, 
and, although it would not pass the rational basis test, if Fiallo applied––
as the Court seems to suggest it does––the measure would still be upheld 
because the government used the facially legitimate purpose of national 
security.  This result would be absurd, and the Court should clarify that the 
President may not justify discrimination against a particular religious 
group simply by crying national security. 
Further, there are several reasons why the Court should not shy away 
from imposing a more rigorous scrutiny on executive action involving 
immigration in the future.  First, action where the executive acts alone, 
without Congress, should garner stricter review than cases where more 
than one branch of government is involved.  This is because action where 
more people must agree is subject to its own checks and review during the 
legislative process, whereas Executive action is subject only the to the 
check of the Court.  If the Court does not meaningfully review executive 
action relating to immigration, then the executive acts, essentially, 
unchecked.  Second, it is nonsensical to require only the legitimate reason 
of national security immigration-related actions because every single 
immigration-related action could be justified by national security.  Such a 
test is not a test at all, as every single law would be upheld under it, 
especially now that drafters of such laws and orders know that simply 
including national security can help avoid review by the courts.  Lastly, in 
matters of foreign relations and immigration, the President’s words matter 
perhaps even more than in other areas of the law because the President is 
the sole voice of the nation on these issues.  Whether or not the Court 
wants to acknowledge the reality of these statements, other nations will, 
and they can have extremely negative consequences.177  Thus, even where 
an executive invokes national security as a justification for his 
immigration-related action, the Court should not be afraid to look beyond 
that justification and consider the President’s statements and other blatant 
evidence of discriminatory purpose. 
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E. Reading Trump Narrowly 
Considering the unusual analysis used by the Court in Trump, and the 
clarifications that would be needed to fully understand its effect on the 
law, the lower courts should read Trump as narrowly as possible.  First, 
the nearly nonexistent standard of review in Trump should not be read as 
to apply to all Establishment Clause cases.  We can see this based on the 
Court’s opinion decided the same term in Masterpiece, where it applied 
the traditional First Amendment framework.  Second, courts should not 
read Trump as applying to all immigration-related government action, 
even if facially discriminatory under Fiallo, Mandel, and Din.  Because 
the Trump Court did not in the end apply these cases leaves the question 
of when they apply open. Courts should thus proceed as if Trump adds 
nothing on this point and consider the facts of the particular case, as they 
would have before Trump.  Trump should not be read as broadening the 
President’s power in immigration to include the ability to do anything as 
long as it is facially justified by national security.  Lastly, in considering 
Trump’s precedential effect, courts should consider that the Proclamation 
at issue included exceptions and waivers, required findings by U.S. 
security organizations, and was redrafted twice after being found 
unconstitutional.  These factors which can point to facial neutrality and a 
reasonable relation to a legitimate government interest, although not 
actually meaningful in the application of the Proclamation, should be 
present in any case where a court seeks to apply the standard of review in 
Trump. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The President should not be permitted to discriminate on the basis of 
religion by merely claiming a national security justification.  Nor should 
the executive see the constitutional requirements of the Establishment 
Clause and the Free Exercise Clause as a mere challenge, attempting to 
work around them by fashioning an order that includes enough of the 
“right” to avoid judicial review while still maintaining the original 
discriminatory purpose.  The statements in Trump are no different than 
those which have caused the Court to apply heightened scrutiny in other 
cases, like Masterpiece.  Under the Court’s traditional Free Exercise 
analysis, which is applied in Masterpiece, the Trump Proclamation almost 
certainly would not have been upheld.  While the President certainly has 
more power in the area of immigration, his actions are not beyond all 
review, and there are many reasons the Court should review such action.  
The Court should make it clear that the standard applied in Trump is not 
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the norm in Establishment Clause cases, or in Free Exercise cases.  Instead, 
cases factually similar to Masterpiece and Trump should be analyzed 
according to the traditional Free Exercise framework, and Establishment 
Clause cases should continue to follow the path set out in Lemon, rather 
than attempting to apply the mix of standards used by the Court in Trump. 
 
